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Abstract
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) undertaken by emerging mar-
ket firms have been associated with competitive advantage. However, little research
has focused on the transferability of this enhanced competitive advantage. Even less
is known about the role played by state-owned enterprises. This paper investigates
whether Chinese information and communications technology firms that undertake
cross-border M&As can improve their non-location bound competitive advantage.
We used cross-border data between 2010 and 2017 and propensity-score matching
and differences-in-differences approaches. We found that cross-border M&As sig-
nificantly improve the home-country-bound competitive advantage. However, the
effect on non-location bound competitive advantage is not significant. From the
perspective of impact mechanism, this is due to a crowding-out effect of cross-
border M&As on research and development (R&D) investment which inhibits non-
location bound advantages. It also results from state-owned enterprises which are
generally considered to have institutional advantages, not effectively using cross-
border M&As to enhance their competitive advantages. This research distinguishes
and quantifies home-country-bound competitive advantage and non-location
bound competitive advantage and establishes a framework for how cross-border
M&As enhance enterprise competitive advantage. It provides an explanation for the
extant research on whether state-owned enterprises can enhance their competitive
advantage through cross-border M&As, and what kind of advantage they attain.
Keywords: China, non-location-bound competitive advantage,
home-country-bound competitive advantage, cross-border M&As,
state-owned enterprises
1. Introduction
Competitive advantage is a major determinant of firm survival and sustained
profitability and perhaps the most decisive factor that enables emerging market
multinational enterprises (EMNEs) to catch up with MNEs from developed coun-
tries. In the existing research which delved into competitive advantage in emerging
market countries, foreign direct investment (FDI) is considered the most important
way to enhance EMNE competitive advantage and technological catch-up [1–3].
Luo and Tung [4] pointed out that, due to weaker innovation capabilities and
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knowledge of resource reserves found in their home countries, EMNEs use FDI as a
‘springboard’ by adding strategic assets to establish a competitive advantage and
achieve corporate growth. M&As undertaken by EMNEs have increased signifi-
cantly over time, especially China’s cross-border ones. According to Thomson
Reuters and Price Water House Coopers, in 2016 Chinese firms undertook as many
as 923 cross-border M&A transactions (excluding M&As in Hong Kong SAR and
Macao) representing a 142% increase from 2015.
One of the most active fields of innovation, and also one of the fiercest areas of
technological competition globally, is represented by the new generation of infor-
mation and communications technology (ICT) firms which focus on cloud com-
puting, big data, and artificial intelligence. The ICT industry has incurred
substantial FDI especially across emerging economies [5, 6]. The ICT industry is
also characterised by significant technological dynamism as a high proportion of
firms engage in internationalisation to obtain strategic assets outside of the firm
boundaries [7]. The Deloitte’s 2017 China TMT Industry Overseas M&A Report
shows that between 2012 and 2016, the growth rate of cross-border M&A trans-
actions in the Chinese technology, media, and telecom (TMT) industry reached
20%. In contrast, their worldwide growth rate reached 8% in the same period.
China has become the most active M&A initiator in the TMT industry. As one of the
ten key areas of China’s manufacturing, the new generation of information tech-
nology plays a pivotal role in China’s implementation of innovation-driven devel-
opment strategies and high-quality foreign cooperation. However, since 2017,
cross-border M&As of China’s ICT industry has faced more stringent scrutiny by
the United States and EU countries. The U.S. government identifies ICT as a critical
technology industry, especially in the 5G and semiconductor arena. Foreign direct
investment in these industries has been subject to strict security scrutiny. For
example, in February 2017, the Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) named
National Integrated Circuit -Industry Investment -Fund Co., Ltd. acquired Xcerra,
an American semiconductor testing equipment manufacturer. This acquisition was
quickly objected to by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS), on national security grounds. Xcerra and the Chinese acquirer signed the
termination agreement on the same day. Therefore, in the current international
investment environment, it is necessary to reconsider whether cross-border M&As
are the best way for Chinese ICT enterprises to enhance their core competitiveness.
A case in point is whether or not the background of state-owned enterprises
enhances or hinder the enterprises’ use of external strategic resources to enhance
their competitive advantage.
Recent studies have focused on the adaptation of internalisation theory for
EMNEs [3, 8]. Such theory states that foreign investments undertaken by EMNEs in
the absence of firm-specific-advantages (FSAs) are made to acquire FSAs and the
intangibles of foreign firms [9]. Therefore, the goal of foreign investment is not to
exploit FSAs but to acquire them [10]. However, little empirical research has been
conducted to examine the actual effect and impact path of cross-border M&As on
FSAs of EMNEs. In that context, internalisation theory proposes that FSAs can
either be transferable (non-location-bound) such as technological knowledge, or
specific to a local context (location-bound) such as local market knowledge and
access to local networks [11, 12]. Some studies believe that firms from emerging
economies such as China, adopt cross-border M&As to gain strategic resources and
then redeploy and integrate them to establish a competitive advantage which can be
transferred in the global market [2, 4]. Other scholars pointed out that EMNEs
undertake cross-border M&As in order to strengthen their strategic assets in their
home countries and seek local—rather than global—expansion by leveraging cheap
labour, natural resources, and institutional advantages of their home countries [13].
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Benefiting from the rapid economic growth of their home countries, EMNEs can
expand into local markets and gain considerable economic returns through cross-
border M&As [14]. However, many EMNEs have fallen into a pattern of continuous
integration and strengthening of external and regional bundling assets, giving them
leverage in their home markets [15]. For example, upon acquiring Volvo, Geely
Automobile achieved a rapid revenue growth at the expense of Volvo’s strong R&D
capabilities and China’s huge auto market, low labour costs, and policy support.
However, Geely’s overseas sales’ share has been declining, with a 2016 domestic
sales ratio of 97.2%. Strategic assets acquired through CBAs can only establish an
EMNE’s competitive advantage if they are attached to home market supports such
as natural resource endowments, labour force, market scale, and local culture [16].
Although the existing literature favours the impact of cross-border M&As,
mixed results have been found concerning the impact on different types of com-
petitive advantage. To examine the inconsistency of current views, this paper dis-
tinguishes and defines two types of competitive advantage of EMNEs according to
their boundedness to its home country. On the one hand, home-country-bound
competitive advantages are defined as a location-bound FSA which is highly
dependent on the home market and cannot transferred to other locations and
therefore limits the capability of EMNEs to become global firms, e.g. home market
scale [14], political connection [17]. On the other hand, non-location-bound
competitive advantages are defined as those that can be transferred within the
enterprise itself and can increase leverage in the global market without the
boundness of location, e.g., global brand, and technology knowledge [18]. As
opposed to home-country-bound competitive advantages, non-location-bound
competitive advantages can reduce the liability of foreignness, and are associated
with a greater capacity to penetrate geographically distant markets and achieve a
global geographic scope [7]. They are therefore the rationale for measuring the
internationalisation ability of enterprises [19, 20], and act as the criterion to
test whether cross-border M&A can constitute the “springboard” of
internationalisation [20, 21].
State ownership has also been a topic of research in cross-border M&As of EMNEs
[22]. Compared to non-SOEs, characteristics of SOEs such as non-economic motiva-
tions, long-term orientation, and different risk preferences influence the foreign
entry strategies of SOEs [23]. Some literature suggests that the state can provide state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) with monopolist advantages at home by creating and
enforcing rules that shape market entry and transactions, and by providing preferen-
tial access to financial resources [24]. SOEs have better access to resources in their
home countries than non-SOEs, and thus are less concerned about the high operating
costs associated with larger geographic distances [25]. On the other hand, the state’s
economic and social objectives can inhibit the SOEs’ ability to develop FSAs [26].
However, the existing literature focuses on whether SOEs can enhance their compet-
itive advantage through cross-border M&As and what kind of advantage they can
attain and remains quite controversial.
We studied the effect of cross-border M&As on enterprise competitive advan-
tage by distinguishing between home-country-bound competitive advantage and
non-location bound competitive advantage in Chinese ICT firms’ contexts. We
addressed the following research questions:
1.Can cross-border M&As improve the non-location-bound competitive
advantages of Chinese ICT firms?
2.Does state ownership enhance the competitive advantage of Chinese ICT firms
through cross-border M&As?
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This research enriches the understanding of FSAs and internalisation theory by
building on insights from home country dependency and by taking into account the
particular heterogeneity of EMNEs such as internationalisation experience and state
ownership. We examined cross-border M&As data from Chinese firms in the
information and communication technology industry for the period of 2010–2017.
Using the propensity-score matching and differences-in-differences approaches, we
compared variations in the competitive advantages of Chinese firm that have
undertaken CBAs and those that have not, to observe the net effect of CBAs on
competitive advantage. We compared the short-term and long-term effects and
examined the impact mechanism of CBAs on competitive advantage.
This study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First,
based on the transferability of competitive advantage, it distinguishes and quan-
tifies home-country-bound competitive advantage and non-location bound com-
petitive advantage, and establishes a framework for how cross-border M&As
enhance enterprise competitive advantage. Second, it empirically analyses the
effects and impacts of cross-border M&As on competitive advantage, deepening
the internal logic of M&As and competitive advantage. Third, this paper focuses on
the moderating effects of firm heterogeneity and internationalisation experience
and enterprise ownership to find out the differences between different types of ICT
enterprises in obtaining competitive advantage through cross-border M&A. It pro-
vides an explanation for the extant research on whether SOEs can enhance their
competitive advantage through cross-border M&As, and what kind of advantage
they attain. The empirical results have distinct implications for the Chinese gov-
ernment in redirecting the FDI endeavours of Chinese enterprises.
This chapter is structured as follows. We first outline the theoretical foundations,
develop our hypotheses, and describe the research design andmethodology. Then, we
present and discuss the results. We conclude by discussing theoretical and managerial
implications, recognising limitations, and suggesting future research possibilities.
2. Theoretical background
2.1 Cross-border M&As and competitive advantage enhancement
Essentially, to compete successfully in any given environment, firms need to cross
certain asset thresholds. Different types of complementary assets determine specific
asset thresholds, which must be bundled together. The asset threshold attained by
this ‘bundling’ determines an enterprise’s competitive advantage. Furthermore, hav-
ing acquired external strategic assets through cross-border M&As, enterprises also
need to integrate and bundle them with their own internal ones. Some enterprise
assets are not firm-specific but are associated with those particular locations in which
an enterprise only has ‘special access rights. ‘Bundling’ external strategic assets and
assets with different attributes determines alternative asset thresholds—i.e., cross-
border M&As will have contrasting impacts on regional competitive advantages
(linked to specific locations) and non-regional competitive ones (that are not
location-specific).
First, enterprises ‘bundle’ external strategic assets with firm-specific-ones to
create a non-regional competitive advantage, which we define as a non-location-
bound competitive advantage. After the completion of cross-border M&As, firms
integrate external strategic assets with their own tangible specific ones in order to
develop a competitive advantage that can be transferred within the enterprise itself.
On the other hand, cross-border M&As also help connect with suppliers and new
customers, broadening the scope of access to external complementary strategic
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assets and best innovation practices [27], enhancing technology and management
levels, and transferring and deploying technology and management experience in
the global market [2]. Once a merger is complete, the focus is on enhancing the
EMNE’s weak absorption of external strategic assets. Second, an enterprise ‘bun-
dles’ external strategic assets with non-firm-specific ones to which the enterprise
only has ‘special access rights’, such as industry franchise rights granted by the
home country government and actual knowledge of the home market in order to
create a regional competitive advantage that we define as ‘home-country-bound’.
Although the rapid growth of emerging economies has increased domestic market
demand, indigenous technology applicability is generally low [28]. In order to
establish economies of scale in their home countries and seize market opportunities,
enterprises acquire strategic resources through cross-border M&As and introduce
these resources directly into their domestic markets [13], using low manpower and
resource costs, and the institutional preferential policies of their home countries to
expand their scale of production. In addition, firms also promote integration into
overseas business networks, enhance professional levels, and achieve geographical
matching of product development, production, and sales [29]. That is to say that,
when faced a huge domestic market demand, enterprises further enhance their
scale efficiency advantage through cross-border M&As. Based on the above
arguments, we established a theoretical framework for how cross-border M&As
enhance competitive advantage (Figure 1), and hypothesised that:
Hypothesis 1. Cross-border M&As effectively promote the improvement of
home-country-bound and non-location-bound competitive advantages.
Besides providing an important channel for firms to obtain strategic resources,
cross-border M&As also increase the complexity of operations as firms need to
coordinate resources located in different geographical locations [2], and corporate
heterogeneity and transaction uncertainty diversify corporate strategy and perfor-
mance [30, 31]. At the same time, research has been conducted in the context of a
large-scale ‘going out’ of Chinese enterprises into cross-border M&As conducted by
firms with government support. Thus, we chose internationalisation experience and
state ownership as variables to analyse the adjustment mechanism of cross-border
M&As and competitive advantage. First, empirical knowledge is an important
resource component of an enterprise, as it plays a key role in international business
and strategic management and constitutes a core element of the Uppsala
internationalisation model [32]. Second, state ownership is the most important
institutional factor affecting firms in emerging economies [22]. Different ownership
systems have several home country institutional resources, such as low-interest
financing and tax reduction [33], and each system’s strategic goals of internationa-
lisation are also significantly different. Enterprises with state ownership can access
more institutional resources in their home countries, such as low-interest financing
and tax relief [33]. Hence, their internationalisation goals are usually different from
those of private enterprises.
Figure 1.
Theoretical framework.
5
Competitive Advantages of Cross-Border M&As to Non-Location-Bound Chinese ICT Firms
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.94032
2.2 Internationalisation experience and M&A competitive advantage effect
EMNEs face the challenges posed by their ‘liability of emergingness’ and are often
the first generation of firms venturing abroad from their home countries, depending
significantly on home country market scale [34]. An important challenge that firms
face when they seek to enter foreign markets relates to their being outsiders in local
networks and to their lack of knowledge of local business opportunities. However, it
can be argued that firms with region-specific experience are less likely to suffer from
such liability, as participation in regional networks in the internationalisation process
provides them with better access to local resources and institutional contacts [35].
Organisational learning theory [36] suggests that firm experiences result in the
creation of knowledge that significantly influences firm strategies and related out-
comes. Firms are viewed as routine-based systems wherein prior experiences are
coded into routines that guide future behaviours. In the context of cross-border
M&As, internationalisation experience has also been closely linked to the ability of
the acquiring firm to absorb new information related to potential targets, something
that can be valuable in the improvement of competitive advantage. However, when
acquiring firms are lacking in prior experience, their ability to absorb and assess
acquisition-related information is generally limited [35].
In addition, the promotion of cross-border M&As for competitive advantage
needs to be realised through resource integration and resource restructuring, which
requires firms to have a rich international experience to deal with the integration
challenges they face in the aftermath of M&As [33]. Transfer of capabilities between
acquiring and target firm as one of the main pillars of integration process, which in
turn is argued to have direct and indirect effects on other aspects of post-acquisition
performance. However, due to its tacit and socially complex nature, transfer of
knowledge across organisational boundaries is not an easy task [37]. Johanson and
Vahlne [38] pointed out that such rich international experience helps firms to identify
opportunities and risks, strengthen their ability to integrate global resources, and
enables them to effectively build business units in overseas markets. Technology
acquisition M&As allow firms integrate suppliers and customers in the value chain,
leading to horizontal or vertical expansion and to the extension of technological
knowledge. By the same token, a lack of international experience hinders the identi-
fication and application of technological knowledge [34], which may cause the emer-
gence of technological reverse spillover effects [39]. In addition, EMNEs that lack an
ownership advantage face more serious disadvantages and need greater resources and
capabilities to cope with the adverse effects of institutional differences. International
experience is an important knowledge resource for firms to cope with institutional
conflicts in host countries and overcome the competitive disadvantages engendered
by institutional uncertainty [40], creating a good external environment for the use of
strategic resources. Based on the above arguments, we hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 2. Internationalisation experience moderates the effect of cross-
border M&As on home-country-bound and non-location-bound competitive
advantages, as these positive gains will be positively correlated to the richness of a
firm’s internationalisation experience.
2.3 State ownership and M&A competitive advantage effect
Particularly in global M&As, actors outside the merging organisations, such as
government, unions, and investors, can become involved in merging process [41].
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) may face more prominent liabilities of
emergingness due to the close relations maintained with home-country govern-
ments, the threat of financial protectionism, reduced MNE transparency with state
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ownership [42], loss of key national strategic assets, and whether home-based
management practices can be transferred to advanced economies [34]. Although
the political connections linked to government ownership help in building
legitimacy and prestige in domestic markets, these firms still participate in global
competition and struggle to gain legitimacy in foreign ones [43, 44].
Our analysis of state owned EMNEs focussed on the influence of home govern-
ments on the internationalisation strategies of domestic enterprises. As agents of their
home governments, SOEs garner more policy support and have stronger institutional
advantages [24], including ‘special access’ to key resources [10, 45]. However, the
internationalisation of SOEs ultimately discloses the will of the government and the
need to strike a balance between economic and political goals [46]. Specifically, state
ownership affects a company’s resource input and internationalisation strategies and
goals [47]. Both state-owned and non-SOEs face pressure from formal or informal
institutions in their home countries, and their responses to these pressures are
influenced by their dependency on resources. If they are highly resource-dependent,
enterprises will choose to comply with institutional pressures to avoid negative con-
sequences [48]. As SOEs are highly dependent on the government for their resource
input, they are more likely to abide by political goals over economic ones. As non-
state-owned firms are more focussed on profit and efficiency goals, their motivation
to seek and utilise overseas strategic resources is stronger and more efficient [47].
Based on the above arguments, we hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 3. State ownership moderates the effect of cross-border M&As on
home-country dependent and non-location-bound competitive advantage. The
positive effects will be smaller if a company is a state-owned enterprise.
3. Methods
We tested the hypotheses by relying on China’s listed information and commu-
nications technology (computers, communications, and other electronic equip-
ment) manufacturing firms. The selection of ICT firms was based on the following
three considerations. Firstly, the new generation of ICT technology, representing
cloud computing, big data and artificial intelligence, has become one of the most
active fields of innovation, and one of the fiercest areas of technological competi-
tion among major countries. Besides, the ICT industry had substantial FDI around
the world and, especially across emerging markets [5]. Secondly, a large number of
ICT manufacturing enterprises have implemented cross-border M&As. Deloitte’s
‘2017 China TMT Industry Overseas M&A Report’ shows that, between 2012 and
2016, the annual compound growth rate of overseas M&A transactions in China’s
TMT industry reached 20%. Thirdly, The ICT industry is also characterised by
significant technological dynamism and a high number of firms engaging in
internationalisation to obtain strategic assets outside the firm boundary. The new
generation of the information technology industry plays a pivotal role in China’s
implementation of innovation-driven development strategies and improving the
country’s competitiveness. Under these conditions, can Chinese ICT manufacturing
enterprises improve their competitive advantage through cross-border M&As? The
answer to this core issue has fundamental practical significance.
We collected M&A data and financial data from two datasets, one of which was
derived from the BVD (Zephyr) database, which is a well-known international
M&As database and widely used in cross-border M&A research [49, 50]. However,
distorted data points remained. Thus, it was necessary to clean the original data and
removed outliers before further analysis could be conducted by using the following
filtering criteria: first, we only retained M&A transactions with a ‘completed’ or
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‘completed assumed’ status, and confirmed the completed M&A transactions
through the company’s website, annual reports, and financial news. Regarding
multiple cross-border M&As of a company within a year, there were multiple
transactions recorded around the target firm for tax minimization purposes [51].
The measurement of the cross-border M&As experience advanced by Jiang [52]
suggests the approval time of multinational enterprises occurs well after the time of
the M&A, which may render an inaccurate recording of the subsequent M&As0
experiences that take place within the same year. Thus, we only retained the first
data recorded, when the same company had implemented multiple M&As with
different targets in a year. Third, we removed any samples missing M&A informa-
tion and the sample of capital increase for foreign subsidiaries [53, 54]. These
excluded samples were not significantly different from retained cases as far as
characteristics such as the percentage of shares acquired, ownership structure of the
acquiring firm, or the acquirer’s acquisition experience in a target’s country. The
second dataset used was taken from the CSMAR database, and included three major
accounting statements—the balance sheet, cash flow statement, and income state-
ment, which provide detailed financial information for the company. The authors
obtained an effective sample data of 98 cross-border M&As undertaken from 2010
to 2017. The sample description is shown in Table 1.
3.1 Empirical model
Distinguishing the correlation and causality between cross-border M&As and the
growth of competitive advantage effect brings some challenges. This is particularly
evident when enterprises with strong competitive advantage conduct cross-border
M&As and the change of competitive advantage may be endogenous and self-
selected. Therefore, performing an OLS estimation would be invalid. Following extant
literature [47], we used the propensity score matching to assess the causal effect of
cross-border M&As on the competitive advantage change of Chinese ICT firms.
First, we used the nearest-neighbour matching method to divide the ICT indus-
try firms into two groups: one with those firms that had implemented cross-border
M&As (denoted as treatment group), and the other with those that had not
(denoted as control group), where the construction enterprise was a virtual variable
Ownership Province of
acquirer
Equity of
acquirer
(%)
Related M&A (If the
first two SIC codes are
the same)
Deal value
(Million
Euros)
Host
country
SOE 31 Guangdong 34 <50 29 Related M&A 83 <10 52 U.S. 25
Non-SOE 67 Jiangsu 16 50–100 21 Non-related M&A 15 10–100 29 Germany 9
Beijing 14 100 48 >100 17 Canada 8
Zhejiang 14 U.K 5
Shandong 7 Japan 5
Hebei 5 Italy 4
Shanghai 3 Malaysia 4
Sichuan 3 Australia 3
Fujian 1 Israel 3
Gansu 1 Others 32
Table 1.
Sample description.
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y of cross-border M&As. All samples and data of ICT firms that do not conduct
M&A (control group) were collected from the CSMAR database.
We constructed the dummy variable CBA where ‘CBA ¼ 1’ for a company that
had implemented cross-border M&As, and ‘CBA ¼ 0’ for a company that had not.
Then we used the logit method to estimate the model:
Pi t ¼ Pr CBAit ¼ 1f g ¼ Φ Xi t1f g (1)
where i denotes the firms in treatment group, j denotes the samples in control
group, t represents time, Pit denotes the probability prediction value or propensity
score to be estimated, Xit1 denotes the matching variable, Φ refers to the logistic
function. After estimating Eq. (1), we were able to obtain the probability prediction
values P^it and P^jt of the treatment and control groups, respectively. The results of
optimal matching Ωit can be expressed as:
Ωit ¼ min P^it  P^ jt
 
，j∈ CBA ¼ 0ð Þ (2)
Following Jiang [52], we selected overall total factor productivity (TFP),
enterprise size (Size), capital density (Capital), and total return on assets (ROA)
indicators as matching variables. The lack of data on intermediate input and added
value indicators made impossible to use the OP [55] and LP [56] methods to
calculate TFP across enterprises. Thus, this paper follows Jiang’s [52] approach to
calculate TFP by using a panel data with a fixed effect. Compared with the OLS
method, panel data can control the intra group differences to the greatest extent to
obtain more consistent and robust capital and labour coefficients. The natural
logarithm of the total number of employees is used to measure the enterprise size.
The data matching was performed using a ratio of 1:3. Thus, 131 ICT firms are
matched as samples in the control group. Table 2 shows the differences in overall
TFP before and after matching The matching results showed that the difference in
overall TFP between the treatment and control group is significant before
matching, and there is a ‘self-selection effect’ in cross-border M&As. After
matching, the means of the overall TFP values of the treatment and control groups
were highly similar, indicating that the ‘self-selection effect’ of cross-border M&As
was effectively controlled.
On the basis of the data matching results, we used the differences-in-differences
method to analyse the impact of cross-border M&As on home-country dependent
and non-location-bound competitive advantage, constructing the respective
dummy variables CBA ¼ 0, 1f g and CT ¼ 0, 1f g to indicate whether a company had
implemented cross-border M&As and the completion time of M&A deal. TheHCBit
and NLBit variables represent the home-country-bound and non-location-bound
competitive advantage, respectively, and ∆HCBi and ∆NLBi represent the changes
of the two types of competitive advantage. In terms of the home-country-bound
competitive advantage (the non-location-bound competitive advantage is calcu-
lated in a similar way), whether the cross-period changes in cross-border M&As are
∆HCB1i and ∆NLB
0
i respectively. Thus, the actual impact of cross-border M&As on
home-country-bound competitive advantage is δ:
δ ¼ E δijCBAi ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ E ∆HCB1i jCBAi ¼ 1
 
 E ∆HCB0i jCBAi ¼ 1
 
(3)
As the E ∆HCB0i jCBAi ¼ 1
 
in Eq. (3) is unobservable, according to the treat-
ment and matched control groups, it was possible to fit the changes of the treatment
group’s HCBit with the matched control group’s HCBit and indirectly identify the
actual impact of cross-border M&As.
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Before matching (TFP) After matching (TFP) Treatment group Control group Matching results
Treatment group Control group t value Treatment group Control group t value
2010 0.315 0.412 1.832* 0.315 0.332 0.890 3 93 6
2011 0.282 0.337 0.954 0.282 0.308 0.271 9 115 20
2012 0.367 0.750 4.831*** 0.367 0.323 0.600 7 137 15
2013 0.425 0.794 8.152*** 0.425 0.458 0.321 8 146 13
2014 0.603 0.745 3.440*** 0.603 0.663 0.412 13 144 13
2015 0.607 0.780 2.551** 0.607 0.633 0.370 21 163 22
2016 0.661 0.631 0.774 0.661 0.683 1.000 24 202 28
2017 0.793 0.626 4.900*** 0.793 0.746 0.100 13 223 14
In order to save space, the above table does not report the matching results of Scale, Capital and ROA. As the duplicate matching samples are excluded, the matching results are not presented 1:3. We performed
the test of robustness matching according to the ratio of 1:1 and 1:2, and obtain similar results without affecting the conclusion of this paper.
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Table 2.
PSM matching results.
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Then, we converted Eq. (3) into an econometric model that could be empirically
tested as follows:
HCBit ¼ α0 þ α1 ∙CBAþ α2 ∙CT þ β ∙CBA CT þ ξit (4)
where the β coefficient of the interaction term CBA CT is the actual influence
of cross-border M&As. β>0 indicates that cross-border M&As systematically
enhance the home-country-bound competitive advantage or the non-location-
bound competitive one.
4. Measures
4.1 Dependent variables
Our dependent variables were home-country-bound competitive advantage and
non-location-bound competitive advantage. Accordingly, home-country-bound
competitive advantage refers to competitive advantage with location-bound attri-
butes gained by ‘bundling’ external strategic assets with the resources, markets, and
institutional environments of the home country. Non-location-bound competitive
advantage refers to competitive advantage with non-location-bound attributes gained
by ‘bundling’ external strategic assets with the acquirer’s firm-specific assets, such as
knowledge and technology, which can be transferred between enterprises.
Within large and fast-growing emerging market economies that correspondingly
have large and growing domestic demand bases, economies of scale are an important
competitive advantage. EMNEs have non-traditional FSAs that enable them to better
exploit scale economies of home countries [45], which is the home-country depen-
dency advantage as defined in this paper. While all firms in homemarkets potentially
have access to economies of scale, some can leverage it better. The home-country-
bound competitive advantage between EMNEs is different as the heterogeneity exists
in the ability of EMNEs to leverage scale economies [10]. The change in economies of
scale decomposed from the TFP index measures how firm-level production diverges
from a constant return to scale [57]. Thus, we measured the home-country-bound
competitive advantage by scale efficiency following Bhaumik et al. [21]. The increase
in scale efficiency reflected the use of external strategic assets to develop home
country resources and markets, which constitutes the basis for competition between
EMNEs and developed economy MNEs (DMNEs) in the home market.
We measured non-location-bound competitive advantage through pure techni-
cal efficiency [21]. Improvements of technical efficiency reflect the extent to which
enterprises embed external strategic assets and develop their own firm-specific-
ones, reflecting the strategic goal of EMNEs to use cross-border M&As as a ‘spring-
board’ to catch up with DMNEs [58].
We used the stochastic frontier model to measure the overall efficiency level
(TE) of each individual and the Malmquist decomposition method suggested by Coelli
et al. [57] to decompose it into scale efficiency (SC), technological progress (EC), and
pure technical efficiency (TC). SC and TC are the measured home-country-bound
competitive advantage (HCB) or the non-location-bound competitive advantage
(NLB). The modified equation for the stochastic frontier estimation is as follows:
LnY i t ¼ β0 þwið Þ þ
PN
n¼1
βnLnXnit þ
1
2
XN
n¼1
XN
j¼1
βnjLnXnitLnXnit
þ
PN
n¼1
βtntLnXnit þ βttþ
1
2
βtt
2 þ υit þ μit
(5)
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where Y it is the output variable of the enterprise, expressed in terms of sales
revenue. Xnit is an input variable, including labour input and capital investment.
Labour input is expressed by the number of employees, and capital investment is
expressed by net fixed assets. Sales revenue and fixed assets were deflated by the
price index and the fixed asset price index, respectively. In addition, υit is the error
term, μit is the inefficient term, and wi is the individual random effect. We assumed
that υit, μit and wi retained the following distributions:
vit  N 0, σ2ν
 
，μit  N
þ 0, σ2μ
h i
，wit  N 0, σ2w
 
whereNþ 0, σ2μ
h i
is a truncated normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2μ.
Once the production function had been estimated, the inefficiency parameter μit
could be estimated as follows:
E^ μit ϵitj½  ¼
σϵ
1þ λ2
ϕ zitð Þ
1Φ zitð Þ
 zit
 
(6)
where ϵit ¼ νit  μit，σϵ ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
σ2ν þ σ
2
μ

 r
，λ ¼
σμ
σν
，zit ¼ ϵitλσϵ，Φ ∙ð Þ and ϕ ∙ð Þ denote
the density and CDF function evaluated at zit.Given the translog specification in
Eq. (7) the efficiency level (TE) could be calculated as:
TEit ¼ exp E^ μit ϵitj½ 
 
(7)
while the overall efficiency level (TE) was decomposed into three factors: scale
efficiency (SC), technological progress (EC), and pure technical efficiency (TC).
ECit ¼
TEit
TEis
(8)
TCit ¼ exp
1
2
∂LnY is
∂s
þ
∂LnY it
∂t
  
(9)
SCit ¼ exp
1
2
XN
n¼1
enisSFis þ enitSFit½ Ln
Xnit
Xnis
 ( )
(10)
where SFis ¼ enis1enis ，enis ¼ ∂LnY isð Þ= ∂Xnisð Þ，eis ¼
PN
n¼1enis. Scale efficiency (SC)
and pure technical efficiency (TC) represent the home-country-bound competitive
advantage (HCB) and the non-location-bound competitive advantage (NLBÞ.
4.2 Independent variable
Our independent variable was the interaction term CBA CT or the product of
the dummy variables CBA ¼ 0, 1f g and CT ¼ 0, 1f g, indicating the net effect on
competitive advantage of implementing cross-border M&As.
4.3 Moderators
Internationalisation experience (experience). Following Jiang & Jiang [59],
internationalisation experience was calculated by the difference between the over-
seas investment approval time of China’s Ministry of Commerce’s ‘Investment List
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of Overseas Investment Enterprises’ and the sample observation period. If the
approval time of the sample company lags behind the observation period or the
difference was less than zero, a value of 0 was assigned to internationalisation
experience. If the difference was greater than zero, a value of 1 was assigned to
internationalisation experience.
State ownership (ownership): ownership was a dummy variable. The value
assigned to SOEs (including SOEs and state-owned holding firms) was 1, and the
value assigned to non-SOEs was 0.
4.4 Control variables
We controlled for firm heterogeneity, time effects, and regional fixed effects.
Firm heterogeneity was controlled through capital density (Capital), enterprise size
(Size), R&D investment (R&D), and marketing expenditures (Market) where
Capital was expressed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of net fixed assets to the
Variables
label
Variables
definitions
Variables calculation Data source
HCB Home-country-
bound competitive
advantage
Stochastic frontier model and the
Malmquist decomposition
method
CSMAR database
NLB Non-location-
bound competitive
advantage
CBA  CT Cross-border
M&As Implement
Dummy variables CBA and CT
indicate whether a company had
implemented cross-border
M&As and the completion time
Bvd-zephyr database.
Experience Internationalisation
experience
Calculated by the difference
between the overseas investment
approval time and the sample
observation period.
China’s Ministry of Commerce’s
‘Investment List of Overseas
Investment Enterprises’; Bvd-
zephyr database.
Ownership State ownership Dummy variable, non-SOEs was
0 and SOEs was 1.
CSMAR database
Capital Capital density Expressed as the natural
logarithm of the ratio of net fixed
assets to the number of
employees
CSMAR database
Size Enterprise size Measured by the natural
logarithm of the number of
employees;
CSMAR database
R&D R&D investment Expressed as the percentage of
R&D investment in operating
income
CSMAR database
Market Marketing
expenditures
Expressed as the percentage of
sales revenue in operating
income
CSMAR database
Time Time effect Dummy variable reflects year of
samples
CSMAR database
Region Region effect
(dummy variable)
Dummy variable reflects
province of the acquirers
CSMAR database
Table 3.
Variables definitions and sources.
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number of employees; Scale was measured by the natural logarithm of the number
of employees; R&D was expressed as the percentage of R&D investment in operat-
ing income; andMarket was expressed as the percentage of sales revenue in oper-
ating income. Time and regional effects were controlled by incorporating time and
region dummies. Table 3 presents the definitions, calculations, and data sources of
all variables.
5. Results
5.1 Instantaneous competitive advantage effect of cross-border M&As
Table 4 san shows the estimation results of the M&As0 instantaneous competitive
advantage effect. Models (1) through (4) examine the impact of cross-border M&As
on the home-country-bound competitive advantage. Models (5) through (8) examine
the impact of cross-border M&As on the non-location-bound competitive advantage.
The results of model (1) show that the coefficient of the interaction term CBA CT
is significantly positive at the level of 5%, indicating that cross-border M&As
improve home-country-bound competitive advantage. Models (2) through (4) grad-
ually add control variables, time, and regional fixed effects. Although the coefficients
of the interaction term CBA CT varied, they were all significantly positive. The
results of model (5) show that the coefficient of the interaction term CBA CT is
positive, but not significant. After adding control variables, time, and regional fixed
effects, the significance of the coefficients did not change significantly, indicating
that cross-border M&As had not improved non-location-bound competitive advan-
tage. Thus, hypothesis 1 was partially supported. The reason may be that firms invest
more resources in developing their own markets, and ‘realise’ them more quickly
than long-term strategic investments such as research and development. Although
firms face competition from DMNEs—which have technological advantages in their
home markets— EMNEs, due to the low technical applicability of the home markets
[28], can be further consolidated by leveraging the unique advantages of their home
countries, and strengthen their competitive advantage therein [10, 45].
5.2 Long-run competitive advantage effect of cross-border M&As
It takes time to bundle external strategic assets with regional ones in the home
country or non-regional bundled firm-specific assets. The effect of cross-border
M&As on competitive advantage may be affected by a lag. Therefore, we examined
the changes in the home-country-bound competitive advantage and the non-
location-bound competitive advantage five years after cross-border M&As. These
results are shown in Table 5. The coefficient of the interaction term CBA CT
indicates that cross-border M&As only have a positive impact on home-country-
bound competitive advantage in the first and second year after the merger, and
their effect gradually weakens thereafter. There is no continuous impact on
non-location-bound competitive advantage. A plausible explanation is that
China lacks international management experience and capabilities, which leads to
serious challenges in post-M&A integration [33]. Birkinshaw et al. [60] pointed out
that Chinese firms adopt the M&A mode to carry out FDI and grant their target
enterprises full post-M&A autonomy, retaining senior management teams and
expecting cross-border M&As to become a ‘highway’ to catch up with developed
countries. This reflects the fact that Chinese firms lack international management
experience.
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Dependent variable: HCB Dependent variable: NLB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CBA 0.054***
(0.017)
0.063***
(0.017)
0.048***
(0.014)
0.050***
(0.025)
0.034
(0.025)
0.043*
(0.025)
0.034*
(0.020)
0.041**
(0.021)
CT 0.104***
(0.014)
0.109***
(0.014)
0.044***
(0.011)
0.028**
(0.011)
0.036*
(0.022)
0.050**
(0.022)
0.066***
(0.019)
0.056***
(0.019)
CBA*CT 0.044**
(0.019)
0.047**
(0.019)
0.033**
(0.016)
0.029*
(0.016)
0.033
(0.033)
0.036
(0.033)
0.033
(0.025)
0.033
(0.025)
Capital 0.141***
(0.020)
0.138**
(0.068)
0.104***
(0.018)
0.001*
(0.001)
0.002
(0.001)
0.002
(0.001)
Size 0.156***
(0.037)
0.133***
(0.034)
0.135**
(0.064)
0.001*
(0.001)
0.004
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)
R&D 0.047***
(0.011)
0.028***
(0.007)
0.031***
(0.008)
0.083***
(0.009)
0.102***
(0.009)
0.096***
(0.009)
Market 0.026**
(0.013)
0.016*
(0.009)
0.012*
(0.006)
0.001
(0.002)
0.008
(0.009)
0.012
(0.021)
_Cons 0.206***
(0.013)
0.018
(0.139)
0.016
(0.141)
0.168
(0.152)
0.655***
(0.016)
0.272
(0.200)
0.543***
(0.190)
0.952***
(0.205)
Year no no yes yes no no yes yes
Region no no no yes no no no yes
N 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343
R2 0.071 0.141 0.376 0.432 0.003 0.310 0.482 0.514
*, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The samples from the above test included the lag phase samples of the treatment group and the control
group, and the subsequent tables were the same.
Table 4.
Instantaneous competitive advantage effect of cross-border M&As.
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Dependent variable: HCB Dependent variable: NLB
(1)
Year 1
(2)
Year 2
(3)
Year 3
(4)
Year 4
(5)
Year 5
(6)
Year 1
(7)
Year 2
(8)
Year 3
(9)
Year 4
(10)
Year 5
CBA 0.041***
(0.014)
0.028**
(0.012)
0.011
(0.010)
0.014
(0.010)
0.014
(0.013)
0.038*
(0.020)
0.043**
(0.020)
0.056***
(0.019)
0.044**
(0.018)
0.029*
(0.017)
CT 0.038***
(0.012)
0.027***
(0.010)
0.031***
(0.010)
0.029**
(0.012)
0.020
(0.015)
0.033*
(0.019)
0.035*
(0.019)
0.042**
(0.020)
0.037*
(0.021)
0.024
(0.025)
CBA*CT 0.022**
(0.010)
0.009*
(0.005)
0.008
(0.011)
0.004
(0.014)
0.018
(0.019)
0.019
(0.025)
0.032
(0.027)
0.046
(0.029)
0.035
(0.031)
0.028
(0.039)
_cons 0.013
(0.147)
0.193
(0.137)
0.012
(0.090)
0.025
(0.103)
0.075
(0.109)
0.960***
(0.226)
1.603***
(0.248)
1.535***
(0.260)
1.875***
(0.243)
2.535***
(0.244)
Control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 1140 945 769 607 458 1140 945 769 607 458
R2 0.402 0.395 0.251 0.266 0.273 0.679 0.732 0.610 0.552 0.590
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Table 5.
Long-run competitive advantage effect of cross-border M&As.
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5.3 Path analysis of the M&A competitive advantage effect
The above results show that the improvement of competitive advantage is
manifested in the dependency on regional resources of the home country. In order
to further confirm and clarify the path of improvement, we analysed the impact
mechanism of cross-border M&As by examining various post-merger business
practices that affect competitive advantage based on the process perspective. Spe-
cifically, we used the interaction term CBA CT to regress with capital density
(Capital), enterprise size (Size), R&D investment (R&D), and marketing expenses
(Market). The results are shown in Table 6.
The results show that cross-border M&As play a significant role in promoting
corporate capital density, enterprise size, and marketing expenses; while their
impact on R&D investment is not significant, as the coefficient value is negative.
The instantaneous test results in Table 4 show that capital density, enterprise size,
and marketing expenses have a positive effect on home-country-bound competitive
advantage, while R&D investment has a significant positive impact on non-
location-bound competitive advantage. Tables 4 and 6 confirm that in the wake of
implementing cross-border M&As, enterprises strengthen their investment in fixed
assets, expand their size, and increase their proportion of marketing expenditures,
but overreach on R&D investment. Rugman [16] pointed out that, for emerging
economies such as China, where the market is growing rapidly, the period of
transformation into a leading competitive advantage through technology integra-
tion is long, and the cycle of establishing economies of scale is quite short. Due to
their low technical applicability [28], these firms are more likely to take advantage
of the economies of scale of their home countries by acquiring overseas strategic
resources and directly feeding them back into the huge local market demand [13].
5.4 Internationalisation experience and M&A competitive advantage effect
Hypothesis 2 was tested by splitting the sample into two groups based on
internationalisation experience and by checking whether there was a difference
between firms with different degrees of international experience. The estimation
results are presented in Table 7. The results show that, for the home-country-
Capital Size R&D Market
CBA 0.035***
(0.003)
0.026***
(0.003)
0.018**
(0.007)
0.014
(0.011)
CT 0.022***
(0.005)
0.020
(0.016)
0.016
(0.016)
0.014***
(0.003)
CBA*CT 0.026***
(0.005)
0.020***
(0.005)
0.016
(0.011)
0.008**
(3.733)
_cons 0.314***
(0.026)
0.214***
(0.018)
0.212***
(0.024)
0.114***
(0.007)
Year yes yes yes yes
Region yes yes yes yes
N 1343 1343 1343 1343
R2 0.316 0.422 0.295 0.384
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Table 6.
Path analysis of the M&A competitive advantage effect.
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bound competitive advantage, the coefficient of interaction CBA ∗CT is signifi-
cantly positive—i.e., cross-border M&As can improve home-country-bound com-
petitive advantage—but the promotion effect differs between enterprises with
different international experience. The coefficient values CBA ∗CT show that
internationally experienced firms are more able to benefit from cross-border
M&As.1 It is important to note that the interaction coefficient du ∗ dt of experienced
enterprises is significantly positive for non-location-bound competitive advantage.
Although the coefficient’s value is small, it shows that internationally experienced
enterprises promote their non-location-bound competitive advantage through
cross-border M&As. These empirical results are consistent with Buckley et al. [34],
who found that internationalised experience knowledge has become one of the key
factors affecting the effectiveness of cross-border M&As. The combination of an
enterprise’s internationalisation experience and its internal resources can give rise to
an interface competency for global resources, thereby enhancing a company’s
knowledge management capabilities and promoting a better use of its internal and
external network resources. In the end, this will create and strengthen competitive
advantage and push a strategic upgrade of a company’s internationalisation [34].
Therefore, hypothesis 2 is also supported.
5.5 State ownership and the M&A competitive advantage effect
In order to test whether state ownership matters, we split the sample into two
groups. Table 8 illustrates the corresponding estimation results. In relation to non-
SOEs, cross-border M&As have positive effects on home-country-bound competi-
tive advantage; however, the impact on SOEs is not significant—i.e., non-SOEs are
experience = 1 experience = 0
(1)
Dependent variable:
HCB
(2)
Dependent variable:
NLB
(3)
Dependent variable:
HCB
(4)
Dependent variable:
NLB
CBA 0.037
(0.038)
0.015**
(0.008)
0.013
(0.009)
0.019
(0.028)
CT 0.102**
(0.045)
0.008
(0.008)
0.009
(0.006)
0.029
(0.026)
CBA*CT 0.107**
(0.053)
0.001**
(0.000)
0.006**
(0.003)
0.003
(0.035)
_cons 0.191
(0.217)
0.829***
(0.044)
0.111**
(0.053)
0.526***
(0.159)
control yes yes yes yes
Year yes yes yes yes
Region yes yes yes yes
N 382 382 961 961
R2 0.351 0.398 0.418 0.360
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Table 7.
Moderating effect of international experience.
1 The result of T-test shows that the coefficients of CBA*CT across the two groups (experience = 1,
experience = 0) are significantly different (p < 0.01).
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Ownership = 1 Ownership = 0
(1)
Dependent variable:
HCB
(2)
Dependent variable:
NLB
(3)
Dependent variable:
HCB
(4)
Dependent variable:
NLB
CBA 0.015
(0.059)
0.032
(0.050)
0.052***
(0.013)
0.004
(0.021)
CT 0.002
(0.027)
0.079**
(0.040)
0.037***
(0.012)
0.024
(0.020)
CBA*CT 0.005
(0.056)
0.009
(0.061)
0.034**
(0.015)
0.002
(0.027)
_cons 0.436
(0.364)
1.751***
(0.403)
0.258
(0.183)
0.855***
(0.257)
Control yes yes yes yes
Year yes yes yes yes
Region yes yes yes yes
N 354 354 989 989
R2 0.506 0.528 0.433 0.568
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Table 8.
Moderating effect of the nature of ownership.
Dependent variable: HCBit Dependent variable: NLBit
HCBit1 HCBit2 HCBit3 NLBit1 NLBit2 NLBit3
CBA 0.058***
(0.012)
0.044***
(0.012)
0.046***
(0.013)
0.040*
(0.023)
0.032
(0.024)
0.038
(0.032)
CT-i 0.093
(0.085)
0.038
(0.047)
0.024
(0.025)
0.042***
(0.007)
0.056***
(0.010)
0.047***
(0.016)
CBA*CT-i 0.004
(0.003)
0.003
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)
0.003
(0.003)
Capital 0.171***
(0.031)
0.167***
(0.027)
0.125***
(0.022)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.003**
(0.001)
0.002***
(0.001)
Size 0.207***
(0.025)
0.177***
(0.022)
0.180***
(0.023)
0.002
(0.002)
0.005
(0.005)
0.004*
(0.002)
R&D 0.043**
(0.020)
0.025*
(0.015)
0.029*
(0.017)
0.076***
(0.008)
0.093***
(0.011)
0.089***
(0.014)
Market 0.025***
(0.008)
0.015***
(0.005)
0.011***
(0.004)
0.001
(0.023)
0.007
(0.006)
0.011*
(0.007)
_cons 0.031
(0.099)
0.026
(0.097)
0.285
(0.331)
0.462***
(0.086)
0.924***
(0.192)
1.618***
(0.320)
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 1225 1186 1030 1225 1186 1030
R2 0.385 0.335 0.125 0.468 0.438 0.282
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Table 9.
Results of the robustness test.
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more dependent on home country resources and markets. In addition, when both
state-owned and non-SOEs are considered, cross-border M&As do not significantly
promote non-location-bound competitive advantage. A possible explanation for this
result is that, on the one hand, both state-owned and non-SOEs lack international
management experience. Chinese enterprises often fail to integrate the strategic
assets they acquire through M&As [33]. On the other hand, SOEs and their host
governments may have conflicting interests. In addition to being an independent
market entity, a state-owned enterprise may, in relation to certain aspects, imple-
ment the strategies of their home country governments, resulting in insensitivity to
market competition [47]. The transfer of strategic assets to SOEs faces more
restrictions and scrutiny [20] than those linked to the profit-seeking nature of non-
SOEs, driving them to use the home market and institutions to carry out ‘short-
quick’ cross-border M&As and obtain short term profit returns [13]. Thus, hypoth-
esis 3 is partially supported.
5.6 Robustness test
Following Fan and Tian [61], we conducted a placebo test on the relationship
between cross-border M&As and competitive advantage by constructing false
cross-border M&A implementation times. Specifically, we advanced the cross-
border M&A times by one, two, and three years and examined the impact of the
interaction terms CBA ∗CT on the competitive advantages. If the CBA ∗CT coeffi-
cient were found to be not significant, it would indicate that there had been no
systematic error in the control and treatment group samples before the implemen-
tation of cross-border M&As, and the empirical result would be stable. The results
of the placebo test showed that the influence of the CBA ∗CT interaction terms on
home-country-bound competitive advantage was no longer significant, indicating
that the competitive advantage improvement was indeed caused by cross-border
M&As, and that the empirical findings on the effect cross-border M&As on
competitive advantage are stable (Table 9).
6. Discussion and conclusions
This paper has studied the effect of cross-border M&As on enterprise competi-
tive advantage by distinguishing it between home-country-bound competitive
advantage and non-location bound competitive advantage in the context of Chinese
ICT firms. We have examined two highly relevant research questions: Can cross-
border M&As improve non-location-bound competitive advantages of Chinese ICT
firms? and Does state ownership enhance the competitive advantage of Chinese ICT firms
through cross-border M&As?
Based on the framework of the influence mechanism of cross-border M&As on
the competitive advantages of enterprises, we used the propensity score matching
and the differences-in-differences methods to empirically analyse the relationship
between cross-border M&As and corporate competitive advantages, the path of
improvement, the moderating effect of international experience, and the nature of
ownership. We found strong evidence that cross-border M&As significantly
improved home-country-bound competitive advantage rather than non-location
bound competitive advantage. The results of the mechanism tests suggest that this
is due to a crowding-out effect of cross-border M&As on R&D investment, which
inhibits the development of non-location bound advantages. It also results from
state-owned enterprises, which are considered to have institutional advantages not
always effective in using cross-border M&As to enhance their competitive
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advantages. These findings enrich the understanding of FSAs in internalisation
theory by building on insights from the home country dependency and considering
the unique heterogeneity of EMNEs such as internationalisation experience and
state ownership.
6.1 Theoretical implications
Although recent studies have paid attention to the adaptation of internalisation
theory to EMNEs [3, 8], whether EMNEs can acquire FSA through CBAs remains
controversial. Some researchers believe that EMNEs that conducted cross-border
M&As can redeploy and integrate foreign strategic assets to establish a competitive
advantage [2, 4]. However, others point out that the competitive advantage
obtained can be used solely in the home country and cannot be transferred into the
global market [13, 14]. Benefiting from the rapid economic growth of their home
countries, EMNEs can expand into local markets and gain considerable economic
returns through cross-border M&As [14]. We have provided a clearer perspective
on this controversial issue by distinguishing and defining two types of competitive
advantage of EMNEs according to their boundedness to their home country, and
their home-country-bound competitive advantages versus their non-location-
bound competitive advantages. In addition, we have found empirical evidence
consistent with the views of Ramamurti and Hillemann [14], that cross-border
M&As significantly improve home-country-bound competitive advantage rather
than the non-location bound competitive advantage of EMNEs in the Chinese ICT
industry. We have explained the reason through mechanism analysis, and therefore
we have supplemented this research area. The results coming from the mechanism
test suggests the presence of a crowding-out effect of cross-border M&As on R&D
investment of ICT firms themselves which inhibits the expansion of independent
R&D and innovation motivation.
Another key concept in internalisation theory that follows Rugman is country-
specific advantages (CSAs). CSAs cover a wide range of external factors at country-
level that affect firm performance, such as labour, technology levels, natural
resources, or the institutional environment [23]. FSAs and CSAs are interlinked as
MNEs tap into CSAs to utilise or develop their FSAs [7]. Although existing research
suggests that CSA is available to all firms in the same country, while all firms in
home markets potentially have access to CSAs, Bhaumik et al. [21] found that some
firms leverage CSA better than others. We defined the home-country-bound com-
petitive advantage in this paper, which is of great value for exploring the heteroge-
neity of EMNEs’ ability to utilise CSA to develop FSA. That is, EMNEs that can
better exploit CSAs in their home country have stronger home-country-bound
competitive advantage. From the perspective of enterprise heterogeneity, we found
that internationally experienced companies can more effectively use CBAs to
enhance their home-country-bound competitive advantage. When compared with
state-owned enterprises, non-state-owned companies can enhance more their
home-country-bound competitive advantage through CBAs. This research has
therefore enriched the understanding of FSAs in internalisation theory by building
on insights from home country dependency and taking into account the particular
heterogeneity of EMNEs such as internationalisation experience, and state
ownership.
6.2 Management implications
The new generation of ICT technology has become one of the fiercest areas of
technological competition among countries around the world. In the current global
21
Competitive Advantages of Cross-Border M&As to Non-Location-Bound Chinese ICT Firms
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.94032
investment environment, it is necessary to reconsider whether cross-border M&As
are the best way for Chinese ICT enterprises to enhance their core competitiveness.
Our findings have important practical implications for cross-border M&As of Chi-
nese ICT firms. At the firm level, enterprises should rationally implement cross-
border M&As. Cross-border M&As have not improved the non-location-bound
competitive advantage of Chinese ICT firms currently. After cross-border M&As,
the development of enterprises depends more on the rapid growth of the home
market scale than on improving internal technical efficiency. Enterprises may
invest more resources in developing the domestic market to obtain short-term
benefits rather than long-term strategic goals such as technology research and
development [28]. Improvements in the home-country-bound and non-location-
bound competitive advantages cannot be achieved automatically, and the
heterogeneity between enterprises will lead to differences in M&As. Therefore,
enterprises should not blindly follow the trend but combine their own conditions
and actively ‘go out’ while accumulating international experience, laying the foun-
dation for a leap forward to advanced internationalisation. At the government level,
even though state ownership can secure financial resources for enterprises, govern-
ment intervention may have a negative impact on corporate FDI. Home govern-
ments can encourage firms to ‘go out’ by providing market and online information,
rather than excessive institutional and financial support. Governments should also
strengthen the supervision model of FDI, and encourage enterprises with the ability
and international experience to conduct foreign investment. Governments should
caution those enterprises that do not satisfy the conditions needed to invest over-
seas and to conduct the ‘arbitrage-type’ M&As that rely on the resources, markets,
and institutional advantages of their home country to tread carefully.
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